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CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT-TRANSPORTATION
FURNISHED

BY EMPLOYER AS SUBSTITUTED

THE SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT-In

MEANS

OF CONVEYANCE

WITHIN

the case of Sjostrum v. Sproule, 49 Ill. App.

2d 451, 200 N.E.2d 19 (1st Dist. 1964), the Illinois Appellate Court for the
First District was presented with the question of whether an accident,
occurring while the parties were in an automobile which had been substituted for the original means of conveyance furnished by the employer,
arose out of and in the course of employment, and thus supplied an affirmative defense to a common law action by one employee for the negligence of
his fellow employee. In reversing its previous decision in the same case,' the
court held that where the use of a substitute means of conveyance was still
within the purview of the original agreement to furnish transportation, the
accident would be compensable exclusively under the Workmen's Compensation Act.
Plaintiff and defendant were engineering employees of Armour and
Co., which was covered by the Workmen's Compensation Act. In March,
1952, the plaintiff was assigned to duty at Bradley, Illinois, where Armour
was constructing a plant. Plaintiff, Sjostrum, was directed to drive to Bradley, either in a car furnished by Armour, or in his own car, in which event
he was to be reimbursed six cents per mile. Defendant, Sproule, was assigned to the Bradley site in September, 1952, and drove his own car,
receiving the six cents per mile reimbursement.
Both parties resided on the South side of Chicago, and no public transportation existed between Bradley and their homes. About two weeks after
Sproule was assigned to the site, the overall supervisor at the Bradley plant,
Mr. Blanding, "advised the defendant that he wanted to eliminate duplicate
travel expenses"; 2 thereupon, Blanding instructed the defendant to take a
company car and drive the plaintiff to and from work. About a week before
the accident, the company car developed mechanical trouble. Thereafter,
up to and including the day of the accident, the defendant drove his own
car, picking up and dropping off the plaintiff in the regular way. Blanding
knew of this modification, and told the plaintiff and the defendant that an
attempt would be made to get another company car. Subsequently, while
driving the plaintiff to work, the defendant attempted to pass another car
on icy roads at the base of a hill, and, in so doing, crashed into a car driven
by John Scott and owned by International Shoe Company.
Sjostrum filed a suit charging negligence against Scott, International
Shoe and Sproule. Sproule asserted Section 5(a) of the Workmen's Compensation Act as an affirmative defense, 8 and he received a directed verdict.
1 Sjostrum v. Sproule, 34 Ill. App. 2d 338, 181 N.E.2d 379 (1st Dist. 1961).
Sjostr.um v. Sproule, 49 I1. App. 2d 451, at 454, 200 N.E.2d 19, at 22 (1st Dist. 1964).
3 Ill. Rev. Stat. Ch. 48, § 138 (1961). "No common law or statutory right to recover
damages from the employer or his employees for injury or death sustained by any employee
while engaged in the line of his duty as such employee, other than the compensation
herein provided, shall be available to any employee who is covered by the provisions of
2
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Judgment was subsequently entered against Scott and International Shoe
Company. Both appealed, and Sjostrum filed a cross appeal against Sproule,
contending that the accident did not arise out of the course of employment
and thus the judgment of the lower court was erroneous. The Appellate
Court reversed the judgment for Sproule and remanded the case to the trial
court.4 It also reversed the judgments against Scott and International Shoe.
On re-trial, the parties stipulated to the facts from the first trial and no
additional evidence was offered. Judgment was entered for Sjostrum for
$35,000 against Sproule. The defendant appealed, again asserting Section
5(a) of the Workmen's Compensation Act as an affirmative defense.
On the second appeal, the Appellate Court found that its previous decision regarding defendant's affirmative defense was in error, reversed the
judgment for Sjostrum, and remanded with direction to enter judgment for
the defendant.5
It is well settled that one employee is not liable to a fellow employee for
negligent acts so long as they arise out of and in the course of employment. 6
In the case of O'Brien v. Rautenbush,7 the Illinois Supreme Court stated
that, "It is our opinion that the Workmen's Compensation Act does preclude a common law action against a negligent co-employee." 8 The later case
of Rylander v. Chicago Shortline Ry. 9 reiterated the court's position and
advanced the purpose of the legislation:
....
[T]he Workmen's Compensation Act precludes a common
law action for damages by an employee under the act against a
co-employee based on the latter's negligence during the course of
their employment. That result follows from the basic purpose of
Workmen's Compensation to place the cost of industrial accidents
upon the industry. That purpose would be blunted if the cost of
those accidents was shifted from one employee to another within
the industry. So far as persons within the industry are concerned,
the Workmen's Compensation Act eliminated fault as a basis of
liability. 10
It is generally accepted that accidents occasioned in traveling to and
from work are not considered to arise out of and in the course of employment. There is, however, a well recognized exception to the general rule,
this Act, to any one wholly or partially dependent upon him, the legal representatives
of his estate, or any one otherwise entitled to recover damages for such injury." (Emphasis
added.)
4 Sjostrum v. Sproule, supra note 1.
5 Sjostrum v. Sproule, 49 Ill. App. 2d 451, 200 N.E.2d 19 (1st Dist. 1964). Certiorari
was granted by the Supreme Court of Illinois on Oct. 1, 1964.
60O'Brien v. Rautenbush, 10 Ill. 2d 167, 139 N.E.2d 222 (1957); Rylander v. Chicago
Short Line Ry., 17 Ill. 2d 618, 161 N.E.2d 812 (1959); Chmelik v. Vana, 31 111. 2d 272, 201
N.E.2d 434 (1964).
7 Supra note 6.
8 Id. at 172, 139 N.E.2d at 227.
9 Supra note 6.
10 Id. at 628, 161 N.E.2d at 822.
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viz., where the employer furnished transportation to and from work for the
employees, any accidents arising out of the use of such transportation are
compensable. 11 It is this exception which the defendant asserted as his
defense, maintaining that since he and the plaintiff were riding in transportation furnished by their mutual employer, the accident in controversy
was within the course of employment, and Section 5(a) of the Workmen's
Compensation Act applied. In this regard, one noted authority has stated:
One well recognized exception to the general rule that the employer is not liable for accidental injuries sustained by the employee
away from the employer's premises while on the way to or from
work is where the employer provides a means of conveyance to or
from work. For example, where a factory is located some distance
from suitable means of transportation the employer sometimes
provides busses, etc., to carry the employees to and from the factory. If an accident should occur while the employee was being
thus conveyed, as by collision between the bus and an automobile,
the accident would be held to arise out of and in the course of the
employment and the employer would be liable for compensation. 12
While there is little doubt as to the adoption of the exception by courts
of most jurisdictions, it would appear that this is the first time that the
exception has actually been tested in the Illinois courts. Prior to 1920, the
Illinois Supreme Court had not even considered the exception, but in
Schweiss v. Industrial Commission,13 the court by way of dicta acknowledged the existence of the exception. In that case, the plaintiff, an employee
of the Wabash Railroad, was killed while crossing the railroad tracks on his
way to work. While the court decided the case on other grounds, it noted
the exception by stating:
The general rule followed in construing the Workmen's Compensation Act appears to be that a man's employment does not begin
until he has reached the place where he has to work or the scene of
his duty, and it does not continue after he has left unless the conveyance in which14he travels to or leaves the premises is furnished
by his employer.
On the same day, the Illinois Supreme Court also decided United
Disposal v. Industrial Commission.15 In that case, the employer's plant was
located several miles outside of Rockford, so transportation by truck was
furnished each morning from a central location in Rockford to the work
site. One evening, a truck driver took a truck to his home in Cherry Valley
without the knowledge or permission of his supervisors, and in violation of
his instructions. The following day he bypassed Rockford and drove the
truck directly to the plant, taking with him two co-employees who also
11 99 C.J.S., Workmen's Compensation § 235 (1958); 58 Am. Jur., Workmen's Compensation § 218 (1948); Annot., 145 A.L.R. 1033 (1943).
12 1 Angerstein, Illinois Workmen's Compensation § 406, p. 272 (Rev. Ed. 1930).
13 292 Il1. 90, 126 N.E. 566 (1920).
14 Id. at 92, 126 N.E. at 568.
15 291 111.480, 126 N.E. 183 (1920).
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lived in Cherry Valley. On the way to the plant, all three were killed in an
automobile accident. In attempting to collect compensation benefits, the
personal representatives of the decedents tried to show that the transportation was furnished by the employer, and therefore the accident was compensable. Though the court failed to use language as patent as that quoted
from the Schweiss case, it inferentially recognized the exception.
...There was no agreement ... to furnish the decedents transportation from Cherry Valley to the farm . . . . While arrangements

had been made for them to ride on the trucks from Rockford to
the farm, it was no part of the contract of hire that they would be
furnished transportation from their homes to the place of their
employment."'
The leading federal case expressing the exception to the general rule
is Cardillo v. Liberty Mutual Co.,17 which dealt with a provision in a union
contract that the employer would furnish transportation to all union members for work done outside the District of Columbia. The employer gave
each worker $2.00 daily, which was added to his weekly check, in lieu of
providing any specific method of transportation. The Court affirmed an
award for compensation for injuries sustained by an employee while on the
way home from work, stating:
It was found that Ticer's employer paid the cost as a means of
carrying out its contract obligation to furnish the transportation
itself. Where there is that obligation, it becomes irrelevant in this
setting whether the employer performs the obligation by supplying
its own vehicle, hiring the vehicle of an independent contractor,
making arrangements with a common carrier, reimbursing employees for the cost of transportation by any means they desire to
use.' 8 (Emphasissupplied.)
In the instant case, however, the plaintiff contended that since the
defendant's car was being used instead of the employer's the exception did
not apply, as the employer was not furnishing the transportation. The defendant countered this by maintaining that the use of the substitute means
of conveyance did not obviate the applicability of the exception, as there
was acquiescence on the part of Armour in using the defendant's car.
This issue, the use of a substituted means of conveyance, has been
considered by several courts, which have found that an accident arising out
Id. at 486, 126 N.E. at 189.
330 U.S. 469, 67 Sup. Ct. 801 (1947). The Court noted four exceptions to the
general rule that accidents occurring while traveling to and from work are not compensable: "(1) where the employment requires the employee to travel on the highways;
(2) where the employer contracts to and does furnish transportation to and from work:
(3) where the employee is subject to emergency calls, as in the case of firemen: (4) where
the employee uses the highway to do something incidental to his employment, with the
knowledge and approval of the employer." Id. at 480, 67 Sup. Ct. at 808.
16
17

18 Id. at 482-3, 67 Sup. Ct. at 809. See Shreve v. Hot Shoppes, Inc., 184 F. Supp. 436
(D.D.C. 1960), affirmed, 392 F.2d 716 (D.C. Cir. 1961). See also, Comment, 33 Iowa L. Rev.
177 (1947-8).

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

of the use of such conveyance is compensable. In Littlefield's Case,19 the
employee was usually driven to work by his employer, Grant. On the day of
the accident, Grant directed another employee, Kinslow, to drive Littlefield
to work, Kinslow, after picking up Littlefield, dropped his car off at a
garage for mechanical repairs, and both employees were then driven to
work in a car owned by the garage. In finding the ensuing accident compensable, the Maine court said:
The further fact that Mr. Kinslow left his own automobile at a
garage and took another conveyance and another driver was only
part and parcel of the original attempt to transport Mr. Littlefield
to his work, and we cannot conceive that20 the ownership of the
second auto affects the question in this case.
In the case of Heaps v. Cobb,21 Cobb was the chief engineer for the
city of Baltimore. A chauffeured limousine was at his disposal; however, as
he intended to drop his wife and aunt at a shopping destination on his
way to work, Cobb used his own car. After he had let his wife and aunt off,
the accident happened. In affirming the award, the court said:
Where an employee is furnished transportation by his employer in
connection with the latter's business, under an agreement express
or implied, the employee is to be considered on duty while using
this transportation. This holds true whether the injury occurred
while the employee was using a vehicle furnished by the employer
or was using one of his own as a substitute, providing 22the substitute
was for some reason connected with his employment.
Finally, in Stadler FertilizerCo. v. Bennet,23 the decedent lived in Fort
Wayne, Indiana, but worked in Geneva, Indiana. He was normally given a
ride in a company truck to and from work. However, the driver who usually
drove the decedent to work was on vacation, in addition to which the company was short a truck due to repairs. Because of these events, the decedent
drove his wife's truck to work, and, on the way home, was killed in an auto
accident. The appellate court granted compensation, indicating that under
the circumstances it could reasonably be inferred that the use of decedent's
wife's truck was "necessary to suit the convenience of the employer," 24 and
thus there was tacit acquiescence by the employer.
From the above it would appear that the court's decision in Sjostrum
has made Illinois one more state which acknowledges that accidents occurring while traveling to and from work in a conveyance provided by an
employer are compensable, and is in keeping with the court's general attitude of enlarging the scope of the Workmen's Compensation Act whenever
19 124 Me. 129, 136 At. 724 (1927).
20 Id. at 131, 136 At. 726.
21 185 Md. 372, 45 A.2d 73 (1945).
22 Id. at 377, 45 A.2d at 78.
23 124 Ind. App. 524, 119 N.E.2d 26 (1954).
24 Id. at 526, 119 N.E.2d at 28.
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possible. This follows from the court's general dislike of having to deny
recovery to one who has suffered substantial injury, but may have done so
partially or wholly through his own fault. Since the Workmen's Compensation Act makes a recovery possible for the injured party, the court's inclination is to apply the act rather than a common law remedy.
K.
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